Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy [Arthur Ripstein] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. In this masterful work, both an. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, Harvard UP, , pp., $ (hbk), ISBN Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is a major accomplishment; there is something to be learned from virtually every page. Ripstein’s goal is to reconstruct and.

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Gadamer said that the biggest single lacuna in Kant studies was the absence of a really good book on Kant’s Rechtslehre.

How can the doctrine of right Rechtif it proceeds independently of the doctrine of virtue or ethics Tugend, Ethikalso constitute a part — indeed, the first part — of Kant’s comprehensive theory of morals Sitten? Sign in to use this feature. Kant may not approve the revolutionary overthrow of a legal order, but he may regard as permissible or even obligatory the creation of a condition of right out of one he would call ‘barbarism’ — organized coercion without law.

These rights further need to be secured, enforced and determined by the creation of a common power capable of establishing a “condition of right” — the sphere of “public right”. History of Western Philosophy.

Force and Freedom — Arthur Ripstein | Harvard University Press

Neither Justice nor Charity? Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy. This chapter also treats Kant’s discussion of the way in which one can own, not another person, but the other person’s status as spouse, child or servant. Chapter 10 takes up the state’s right to punish crime, and Ripstein’s position broadly follows that of Sharon Byrd, who emphasizes the state’s right coercively to prevent wrong, and sees Kant’s well-known retributivism as conditioned by this aim.

But Ripstein points out that while “Kant’s understanding of the basic range of public powers is greedom in one sense, riipstein is] permissive in another”.

Ripstein offers an interpretation similar to Jan Joerden and Alyssa Bernstein: This book, therefore, can’t be said to settle the deepest problem about Kant’s theory of right.

Prominent themes include rights in the body, the relation between morality and law, the nature of coercion and its role in legal obligation, the role of indeterminacy in law, the nature and justification of political society and the theory of the state. This among many other Kantian assertions would seem directly to contradict the claim that it “follows from” the principle of ethics. Please note that irpstein are subject to tax and the final price may vary depending on your country of residence.


He contrasts this with a libertarian model, according to which a state is the creation of private persons empowered, essentially as only another private person, to do what they have set it up to do.

The essays offer readings and elucidations of Ripstein’s thought, dispute some of his claims and extend some of his themes within broader philosophical contexts, thus developing the significance of Ripstein’s ideas for contemporary legal and political philosophy.

Instead, he begins by noting Kant’s sharp distinction between right and ethics, and proceeds from the Kantian concept of right or external freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Social and Political Ripsteib.

But this book finally appears to be it. Fried – – The Journal of Ethics 16 1: It also does not provide, in my view, a satisfactory interpretation of certain parts of it, such as punishment and international right.

Force and Freedom

There is no space here to say why I regard this interpretation of Kant, though sympathetic and philosophically plausible, to be textually indefensible. This would include not only protecting them from a condition of poverty freerom threatens their bodily survival a condition of free agency but also from relations of dependency on others.

Kant’s theory divides right into two basic spheres: And if the principle of right is such an “extension” why doesn’t Kant present it this way — by first stating the Categorical imperative and then explicitly introducing the concept of right as an “extension” of it? Uleman – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 3: Chapter 7’s treatment of international right seems hard to forfe with what Kant defends in all his main writings on the subject.

Ripstein also argues that consent cannot freeom understood as a merely unilateral act, but always has the structure of an offer and an acceptance, requiring both parties to join their wills pp. Kantian external freedom is not a matter of advantage, welfare or other “material” considerations, and the innate equality it involves is not a matter of an ripsteib distribution of any benefit.


Freedom and Force

He argues in effect that a rightful international organization of states can never be more than what Kant calls a ‘congress’ MS 6: This collection of essays takes as its starting point Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: But I’m sorry that Gadamer, though he lived to the age ofstill did not live long enough to read it.

A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights. Harvard University Press Foundations of Natural Right: Readings in the Philosophy of Law. The fact that Kant’s theory of right is grounded solely on the individual’s right to freedom independence of another’s will has suggested to many it must be libertarian in spirit.

He then cites Kant’s claim that the principle of right enters “as a postulate that is incapable of further proof” MS 6: The innate right to freedom needs to be extended, as Kant argues, to means outside your body through the right of property over things, and rights relating to other persons — of contract and of status — which comprehend the sphere of “private right”.

Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Sign in Create an account. Ripstein argues, for instance, that when the poor are supported through any form of charity, however benevolently intended, this puts them in essentially the same position they would be in if they were slaves.

Nevertheless Ripstein does ably expound Kant’s theory of right in the way it ought to be expounded, and he gives thoughtful discussion of a wide range of issues from the authentically Kantian perspective on right and politics.

In that respect, I am more than satisfied with this book. I can only report that I find it, and his attempt to resolve the main question, deeply unsatisfying. External Freedom in Kant’s Rechtslehre: